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README.md
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# bl_sbx
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## itunesstored & bookassetd Sandbox Escape
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This repository contains a proof-of-concept demonstrating how maliciously crafted `downloads.28.sqlitedb` and `BLDatabaseManager.sqlite` databases can escape the sandbox of **itunesstored** and **bookassetd** on iOS. By abusing their download mechanisms, the POC enables writing arbitrary `mobile`-owned files to restricted locations in `/private/var/`, including MobileGestalt cache files—allowing device modifications such as spoofing the device type.
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### Key Points
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- Compatible with iOS **26.2b1 and below** (tested on iPhone 12, iOS 26.0.1).
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- **Stage 1 (itunesstored):** Delivers a crafted `BLDatabaseManager.sqlite` to a writable container.
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- **Stage 2 (bookassetd):** Downloads attacker-controlled EPUB payloads to arbitrary file paths.
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- Writable paths include:
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- `/private/var/containers/Shared/SystemGroup/.../Library/Caches/`
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- `/private/var/mobile/Library/FairPlay/`
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- `/private/var/mobile/Media/`
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- Demonstrates modifying `com.apple.MobileGestalt.plist` to validate successful exploitation.
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### Outcome
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iOS fails to block crafted download tasks, allowing unauthorized file writes unless the target path requires `root` ownership (or the fileowner is not `mobile`).
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**Check the blogpost for more information**
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### Disclaimer
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This project is for **educational purposes only**.
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Do **not** use it for illegal activities.
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Apple may patch this behavior at any time.
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